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A B S T R A C T Daniel Dennett, in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, argues that natural
selection is a universal acid that eats through other theories, because it can
explain just about everything, even the structure of the mind. Emanuel
(Manny) Schegloff (1987) in ‘Between Micro and Macro: Context and Other
Connections’ opposes the importation of ‘macro’ (sociological/sociolinguistic)
factors into the ‘micro’ (interaction analysis), suggesting that one might reverse
the strategy instead. Like Darwin, he is coy about whether he just wants his
own turf, but the idea opens up the possibility of interactional reductionism. 
I will argue against interactional reductionism on methodological grounds:
Don’t bite off more than you can chew! Instead I’ll support the good old
Durkheimian strategy of looking for intermediate variables between systems 
of different orders. I try and make the case with data from Rossel Island, Papua
New Guinea.
K E Y W O R D S : conversation, joking relationships, kinship, micro and macro
contexts, Papua New Guinea, reference, Rossel Island
1. Universal acid
My starting point is Daniel Dennett’s (1995) book, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, in
which he argues that the idea of natural selection – ‘descent with modification’
in Darwin’s one-liner – is a universal acid that cannot be bottled up. It eats
through other theories, because it can explain just about everything: it can be
applied to brain maturation, consciousness, culture, and all the furniture of the
mind. Whether Darwin foresaw all these extensions of the theory is moot, but he
certainly knew it was dangerous – he was only too aware of the corrosive effect
on religion, and so sat on the theory for 20 years (certainly Marx and Nietzsche
saw the dangerous extensions immediately). Today, there are two schools of
Darwinism, the ‘soft Darwinists’ (Gould, Lewontin, Rose) who think that natural
selection can be contained, and must be supplemented by many other processes,
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and the ‘ultra-Darwinists’ (like Dennett and Dawkins) who embrace the
dangerous interpretation of the idea and pursue its consequences wherever they
take us.
It seems to me that there is an analogy with the ‘soft’ and ‘ultra’ theorists in
the study of human verbal interaction. A number of enormously creative and
insightful scholars – such as Birdwhistell, Bateson, Garfinkel and Goffman –
opened up that field, but few have done as much to establish the foundations of a
new discipline as Emanuel (Manny) Schegloff. The contributions that he and his
fellow conversation analysts have made to understanding the systematics of
human social interaction have been unparalleled. For current purposes, let’s take
him as our Darwin. Now, Schegloff (1987), in the essay ‘Between Micro and
Macro: Context and Other Connections’, opposes the importation of the macro
(sociological/ sociolinguistic) into the micro (interaction analysis), suggesting
innocently that one might reverse the strategy instead. What he specifically
argues against is fishing expeditions by the macro-theorists, whereby they drop
lines into the interaction waters hoping to catch fish they have already labelled
‘power’ or ‘gender’, or the like. The reversal he suggests is that instead of thinking
of social institutions as organizing and creating the interaction that takes place
within them, we should rather think of interaction patterns as engendering the
very social institutions themselves. The example he works through is persuasive:
he shows how various US presidents have tinkered with the structure of
presidential press conferences, only to find that the new arrangement has a quite
unintended life of its own.
The kernel idea – the dangerous idea of my title – is that social order is the
local product of interaction. Stated thus, it seems innocuous enough. But
suppose we read it as all social order, everything – from institutions to economics,
from kinship to politics, from etiquette to grammar. Now it is no longer so
innocent – in fact then we would have a reductionist programme in the social
sciences as ‘dangerous’ as ultra-Darwinism in biology.
Like Darwin, Schegloff is actually coy about how far he wants to push the
idea.1 There are two plausible interpretations. The ‘safe’ interpretation is a theory
that holds that interaction should be studied in its own right, as a system with its
own distinctive properties. Only once we understand the system does it make
sense to take its own integral variables and ask how they connect to higher-order
social structures and processes. Meanwhile, the macro-fishermen should please
stay off the interactional waters, since they are not the experts there. The
‘dangerous’ interpretation holds that interaction is indeed the fount of all social
order. After all, it is through interaction that children learn about social
relations, institutions, grammar, and ways of thinking. All these higher-order
levels depend for their existence on re-enactments at the interactional level – in
the last analysis they are abstractions from the behavioural realities of the
interactional level. The more you begin to think about it, the more dangerous the
idea becomes.
Let’s just rehearse the ideas a little further. The model that Schegloff is
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decisively rejecting is a view where cultural rules and social systems, on the one
hand, and linguistic rules, on the other, are the locus of social order, and
interaction is merely the football pitch, as it were, where these are deployed, as
the traditional talk in terms of ‘social roles being played out’ or ‘competence
being deployed in performance’ suggests. What’s wrong with that view is that
interaction has a life of its own as a system, and has the habit of kicking back, as
in the organization of presidential press conferences. The ‘safe’ interpretation
would treat each of these levels, say, the sociocultural system, the linguistic
system and the interaction system, as separate but equal. We can acknowledge
that the interaction system deserves a science of its own, and that those seeking
connections to other levels had better understand the workings of the inter-
actional level. But no system is accorded ontological priority. The ‘dangerous’
interpretation, on the other hand, places the interaction system centrally and
threatens to reduce all other systems to outcomes of the workings of interaction.
One can see this tendency in, for example, the language socialization literature
(see e.g. Schieffelin and Ochs, 1986), where sociocultural patterns are seen as
routinized interactions, or equally in the interactional linguistics literature,
where grammar is thought of as frozen interaction (see e.g. Ochs et al., 1996;
Ford et al., 2002). Pushing this programme through to the hilt would amount to
interactional reductionism.
2. Some working presumptions about the interplay between
language, culture and interaction
The invitation to contribute to this special issue has made me think a little bit
about where I stand on these issues. In the work on ‘politeness’ (Brown and
Levinson, 1987), our central idea was that a few key parameters of social
relationships are the key to the ‘micro–macro link’: the nature of verbal inter-
action is tied to culture and social institutions through the way in which social
relationships are conducted. In my work on pragmatics (Levinson, 1983, 2000),
the science of the unsaid, I have been preoccupied with the key idea that rich
principles of interpretation allow minimal verbal expression, thus linking
grammar to usage in interaction. Finally, in my work on the relation of language
to cognitive style (Levinson, 2003), the central idea is that language-based
cultural specializations in thinking afford distinct interactional styles, thus
linking language to interaction through mind (‘cognitive style’). In none of this
work have I been an interactional reductionist – I have treated interaction,
grammar, and culture as systems in their own right. True, they make essential
reference to one another, as when social institutions, grammar, and interaction
come together in specialized activity types or speech events (Levinson, 1992), as
in a law court where the system of social sanctions, the grammar of questions,
and the special turn-taking interact to form a micro-system. My background
working presumption has been that you don’t get a better model by reductionism
in any direction. Rather, by the methodological principles of ‘divide and rule’ and
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‘don’t bite off more than you can chew’, complex behaviour is best understood
as a system of interrelated systems. The models I have used, without too much
ratiocination it has to be admitted, essentially involve independent systems
(linguistic, sociocultural, and interactional) linked together in the Durkheimian
manner, that is, by focusing on crucial intermediate variables. Thus, types of
social relationship link linguistic systems to social systems, inferential heuristics
link cultural systems to linguistic systems, while cognitive styles link interaction
systems, cultural systems and linguistic systems. The piggy in the middle, the
area from which these Durkheimian intermediate variables are plucked, is Mind
– it is mental parameters (such as cognitive styles), mental templates (such as
social relationships), and mental habits (such as inferential heuristics) that hook
the three major systems together.
But having confessed to my presuppositions, I should also confess to having
held these views without sufficient self-examination. And when I consider the
‘dangerous’ interpretation of the role of social interaction in human life, I do not
find it easy to shrug off (in fact, Schegloff ’s paper has always unsettled me ever
since it appeared). So in this article I’ve set myself the task of seeing whether I
can retrospectively muster support for the ‘safe’ interpretation. Let’s see if it can
be done.
3. Rossel Island, Papua New Guinea – the ramifications of
kinship
I choose the ground on which to argue carefully. I will draw on details from an
ethnographic setting, because these alien settings have a way of refreshing our
vision. The society in question is located on Rossel Island, the last island off the
eastern tip of Papua New Guinea.2 The island lies just outside the boundaries of
the Kula ring, due both to geographical isolation and to the fact that the
language and culture are not akin to those of the surrounding Massim peoples –
the 4000 inhabitants speak a ‘Papuan’ language, actually an ancient isolate,
called Yélî Dnye. In the days when students still read ethnographies, the Rossels
were famed for their intricate system of shell money (Armstrong, 1928). I will
deal mainly with two of our levels, the sociocultural level and the interactional
level, focusing in the case of the former on the kinship system and in the case of
the latter on systems for person reference.
The kinship system of Rossel Island is dominated by matriclans and matri-
lineages – descent groups traced through the female line. These regulate much of
social life, including especially marriage, which is exogamous of the clan (there
are 15 effective clans), the payment and inheritance of valuables, and the
distribution of sorcery accusations. The importance of kinship can be gauged
from the fact that adults have in their heads genealogies 10 generations deep
covering a thousand individuals. The details of the kinship system, which also
has a strand of patrilineal reckoning, would take us far afield (see Levinson, in
preparation).
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If kinship is, par excellence, a sociostructural matter, it nevertheless has direct
repercussions on another of our levels, the linguistic system. There is a serious
linguistics of kinship. The first element is the system of kinterms. The kinterms
belong to a type known in the trade as a Crow III system (Lounsbury, 1969), with
a specific kind of cross-generational skewing, whereby, for example, a father’s
sister (FZ) one generation up from ego counts the same as a father’s sister’s
daughter’s daughter (FZDD), one generation down from ego. These generational
collapses can be expressed by ‘skewing rules’ as in Figure 1. On top of these rules
is mapped a rule of alternating generations, so FZ is called differently from FZD
but the same as FZDD, as in Figure 2. Again, the full details don’t concern us
here. But it is well known that such skewed kinterms correlate almost without
exception with matrilineal descent systems. Another interesting property of the
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CROW System Skewing Rules
1.Skewing
a. female’s B … ? S… (e.g. MB ? MS (= B))      
b. … male’s Z ? M          (e.g. FZ ? FM)
2. Merging:
male’s B ? that male  (e.g. FB ? F),  
= woman’s Z ? that woman (e.g. MZ ? M)
3. Half-sibling:
FS ? B, MS ? B, FD ? Z, MD ? Z
FZDD  ? FMDD (1b)
FMDD ? FZD (3)
FZD     ? FMD (1b)
FMD    ? FZ (3)









F I G U R E 1 . Some special features of matrilineal kinterm systems
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F I G U R E 2 . Terms which alternate across generations, and affinal terms
kinterm system is that it has terms for kin dyads: thus, there is an unanalysable
term chimi meaning ‘a man with his sister’s son’, or ghee meaning ‘woman with
her offspring or sister’s offspring’, where the matrilineal theme is also clear.
I am under no illusions that many readers of this journal will be very
interested in these anthropological details. But the general point is important: a
feature of the social structure – namely matrilineal reckoning of kin – is reflected
directly in a linguistic subsystem. But there are also other repercussions of a
matrilineal system of kinship on the linguistic system. One of the more
interesting of these is a taboo vocabulary used exclusively to affines – those
connected by marriage rather than descent. (The scope of the affinal kinterms is
shown in Figure 2, in which one notes that in a matrilineal kinship system a
man’s offspring belongs not to his descent line but to that of his wife, they are kin
only through an affinal link.) In the presence of one’s spouse’s parents or
siblings, ordinary words for clothing, intimate possessions and body parts may
not be used. Instead, an alternate set of terms is used, as illustrated for body-part
terms in Figure 3, where one can see there are alternate words for eye, nose, arm,
etc. The kind of detail here that excites anthropological linguists is that in the
ordinary language there is no word for ‘leg’ – instead one must use different
words for upper leg and lower leg: but in the taboo language, there is only a more
general word which covers both parts with a single term for ‘leg’ (see Dixon,
1971, for the generalizations here), showing that Rossel anatomical ontology is
not so strange after all.
But again, the relevant point here is that the matrilineal kinship system
imposes itself on the language, in what could be called ‘bystander honorifics’ (see
















F I G U R E 3 . Comparison of some words for body parts in ordinary language and in-law
language
Levinson, 1983: 90–1), that is to say terms that indicate that respect is being
given not to persons spoken to, but to those who just happen to be within
hearing. But now we are moving into our third level or system: the interaction
system. The language use here is just part of a larger set of interactional
constraints between in-laws. Affines cannot share ‘free goods’ – the tobacco and
betel nut, utensils, and so on that normally can be freely borrowed or begged. Nor
can they get close to or touch affines, or their belongings or clothing. And they
certainly cannot address them directly, or look them straight in the eye. In
interactional terms, in-laws have restricted rights of participancy – they are part
of the respected furniture, not part of the action, and one talks indirectly in their
presence in the same way one whispers in church.
4. A mysterious genre of joke
There’s much that happens on Rossel Island that I still fail to understand. One of
these mysteries I did finally unravel. People sometimes burst into laughter at
some invisible joke. Now humor, like wine, is well known not to travel well, but
still some of these cases seemed peculiarly obscure. Consider the following.
Waiting for the church congregation to get its act together, sit two individuals I’ll
call A and B, with some boys behind them. A schoolteacher has been yelling
inanities through a megaphone, and suddenly B says:
(1) r03_v20_s5 00:00:32-
1 B: taa ghi u mênê wunê mbumu




3 B: taa ghi u mênê wunê mbumu




5 boys: (2.8 secs of giggles)
6 A: ghêêdî puu km:ee wunê mbumu
‘He’s yelling under a mangrove tree’
[ [
7 B: kêle nîmo taa ghi u mênê wunê mbumu
‘No we are going to talk into a bit of bush-knife’
8 boys: (giggles)
B’s joke – judging from the giggles of the boys in line 2 – is met by A with a
chagrined grin. B repeats the joke and when the giggles die down, A ripostes in
line 6, with both A and B now smiling, and everyone has a giggle. Some of the
flavour can be got from the sequence of stills taken from the video in Figure 4.3
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The puzzle for me was why is talking into a bush-knife either relevant or
funny, and what’s this about being under a mangrove, given that we are far from
the beach where such trees can be found? A further puzzle is that although this
laughter has the feel of ‘universal laughter’, Rossels don’t receive a good joke
with normal (‘universal’) laughter – jokes are properly received with a culture-
specific sequence of three carefully synchronized whoops simultaneously with a
shaking of hands. The sequence of stills in Figure 5, taken from another inter-
action, gives some idea of what this looks like.
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F I G U R E 4 . The father-in-law joking sequence
in example (1) (read left to right, then down)
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So it turns out that the jokes in example (1) are not ‘funny-funny jokes’ – the
giggles are the way in which ribbing, i.e. jokes at another’s expense, are properly
received. But what’s the joke? The locals decoded it for me. When B says, ‘He’s
speaking into a bit of bush-knife’ this is an oblique allusion to A’s father-in-law,
who killed his wife with a bush-knife before committing suicide. And when A
responds, ‘No, he’s talking under a mangrove tree’, this is a parallel allusion to
B’s father-in-law, who fell down from a mangrove tree and died horribly from his
injuries. From this I learned that there is a whole genre of father-in-law jokes,
and from then on people would nudge me to make sure I got them: they nearly
always involve some grisly, miserable happening to the poor father-in-law, or at
least some mockery of his apparel or habits.
So why would some peoples have mother-in-law jokes, and some peoples have
father-in-law jokes? You can find the answer in classical kinship theory. For
example, Lévi-Strauss (1958) argued that instead of thinking of the nuclear
family (mother, father, children) as the ‘atom’ of kinship, the real ‘kinship atom’
is composed of mother, father, children and mother’s brother. Following
Radcliffe-Brown (1952), he noted that whereas in a patrilineal society, dad is the
authority figure, and the uncle (mother’s brother) the affectionate friend, in a
matrilineal society the mother’s brother is the authority figure, and dad the
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reception 
of a funny 
joke
F I G U R E 5 . Mode of receipt of a ‘real’ joke
friend. That’s because in a patrilineal system authority and assets flow through
the father’s line, whereas in a matrilineal system, the power and assets flow
through the mother’s line, represented by the mother’s brother. Figure 6 should
help to make clear the different distribution of affection (marked +) and
authority (marked – ) in these two systems.4
A young man (bottom right triangle) marrying the daughter in this atomic
configuration naturally owes respect to the bride’s father and her mother’s
brother – they are affines, and on Rossel we have already seen how they are
treated with avoidance-respect, using the taboo language reserved for in-laws.
Still, there’s a difference in the relation of groom to father-in-law in the two
systems. In the patrilineal system the father-in-law is the bride’s authority figure
(her dad) – she owes him respect, just as her new husband does: there’s a match
of attitudes. But in the matrilineal system, the groom’s father-in-law is the bride’s
affectionate friend (her mother’s brother is the authority figure, not her dad),
while the groom owes him elaborate respect: in short, there is a clash of attitudes
(again, see Figure 6 for clarification). Now when there is a mismatch of projected
attitudes, kinship theorists predict ‘joking relations’: if A owes B both respect and
friendship, then A and B may overtly joke with one another. In the Rossel father-
in-law case at hand, though, we have a triangle, where A (the son-in-law) owes
B (the father-in-law) respect, but A is married to C (a relation of intimate
equality), and C has a friendship relation to B (her dad) – there is a triangular
mismatch, not a direct one. This is what generates the tension that makes it
possible for some other individual to joke to A about B, a joke A could never make,
but which he can still find sort-of-funny.
So there’s a calculus of kinship, which gives us a calculus of attitudes, which
predicts for any type of kinship system where the joking tensions will be. We can







Joking marks ambivalent (+/–) kinship relations
Lévi-Strauss’s 'Kinship atom'
clan elder clan elder
F I G U R E 6 . Distribution of attitudes across the relations of the ‘kinship atom’ in patrilineal
and matrilineal systems (ego is bottom left triangle)
take the reasoning a bit further: in the Rossel case, not just any person D in any
kinship relation to A can joke with A about his father-in-law. If D was in B’s
matriclan (i.e. the same clan as the father-in-law), such a joke would be an ‘own
goal’. Since the joke will be reciprocated, D has also to ensure that his own father-
in-law (to be butt of the next joke) is not e.g. in the same clan as A (then D would
be putting A in a position where he must insult himself). Finally, A and D have to
be males of the same generation, otherwise the reasoning doesn’t work. See
Figure 7 for diagrammatic help with these restrictions between the jokers.
I come now to the point of all this. Comparative kinship theory (on which, see
e.g. Meyer Fortes, 1969), ranging over matrilineal, patrilineal and cognatic
systems, predicts the character of kinship joking, and more crucially, it tells us in
which social relationships in any society it is likely to occur. Comparative kinship
theory is, of course, not in the heads of our jokers – they take the local kinship
ecology for granted, and will joke only in the right ecological niche. But if we
want to know exactly why this joke occurs here in this conversation right now,
and how it is recognized and received, well, now we need a different level of
analysis, a theory of interactional systematics (see e.g. Sacks, 1972). I present
this as an example of why we need TWO distinct levels of analysis, comparative
sociocultural theory and interactional theory, not just one. They each tell us
different things, and they are in different people’s heads – knowledge of compar-
ative kinship theory is restricted to the bird’s-eye view of the social theorist, while
the principles of interactional systematics must be in the heads of the
interactants, otherwise they will make a mess of it.
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Constraints on jokers:
1. D can't joke to A about B if 
(a) D and B are in the same clan – then D would be insulting his own   
uncle!
(b)  A is in same clan as E – since then A could not reciprocate the joke



















F I G U R E 7 . The relationships implied by Rossel father-in-law jokes
5. Culture and naming: the interplay between cultural systems
and interactional systematics
Let’s now focus more on the level of interactional systematics, while still
continuing our kinship theme. We have seen that in the presence of affines, the
use of the taboo in-law language is required. But the taboos extend wider. All
sorts of relatives, including the recently dead and living affines, should not be
mentioned by name. How are these naming taboos actually handled in inter-
action? Let’s look at a case:
(2) Managing a daughter-in-law naming taboo (R03_v6 00:00:8:09)
1 N: wu dmââdî a kêdê Thursday ngê anê lóó
‘That girl told me she would go across on Thursday’
2 P: n:uu ngê?
‘Who did?’
3 N: o(yi dmââdî) o
‘That girl’
4 P: Mby:aa tp:oo módó ngê=
‘The daughter of Mby:aa did?’
5 M: =Kpâputa u kpâm?
‘Kpâputa’s wife?’
6 P: Kpâputa u kpâm?
‘Kpâputa’s wife?’
[
7 M: ee! ee! kî tpóknî mwi lee dmyino, Stephen a kwo, mwi lee dmyino ó!
‘Hey kids go over there, Stephen is here, go right over there!’
[ [
8 N: EBF Head-point East
9 P: Kpâputa u kuknwe apii?
‘Kpâputa’s widow, right?’
[ [
10 N: (°kî dmââdî°) EBFmm
(That girl) ‘you got it’
11 M: (to kids) ka, tin ghi mwi ’nuw:e, mwi pââ y:i,
‘OK take the tins over there, run off over there’
(conversation lapses)
The reference in line 1 to ‘that girl’ (with the deictic wu indicating ‘invisible, only
indirectly ascertainable’) is used by N to introduce a new sequence. The reference
is vague to say the least, and P doesn’t get it: he asks ‘Who?’ But what we then
get is not a name, but a sotto voce repetition of ‘that girl’ (now with a different
deictic yi, ‘that as previously mentioned’). P now guesses who it could be, M
offers another guess which P pursues, eventually obtaining from N an eyebrow
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F I G U R E 8 . Frame sequence corresponding to example (2)
“That girl said to 












































flash (marked EBF in the transcript), which signals either ‘yes’ or ‘go on’, followed
by a head-point to the East (this in overlap with M talking to kids in line 7). A
reformulation of the guess in line 9 (from Kpâputa’s wife to Kpâputa’s widow)
gets a clear eyebrow flash and ‘mm’ in line 10. Figure 8 provides a sequence of
stills which give a better idea of how the sequence runs off.
The problem here is that N is talking about his daughter-in-law, an affine he
should not name, moreover one once married to his dead son. Reference is
achieved by first using a general description, ‘that girl’, then letting his
interlocutors generate descriptive guesses, to which he can assent in a minimal
form (sotto voce, raised eyebrows). He provides one additional clue, namely the
head-point to the home-base of the girl in line 8. Notice that his interlocutors
have quickly realized the nature of the problem, namely that N wants to mention
someone he can’t name, for in their guesses (lines 4, 5, 6, 9) they avoid offering
the name of the girl, choosing naming instead a relative of hers, and specifying
her relation to that relative.
Now anthropologists might be tempted to say at this point: ‘You see! There we
have it, another cultural idiosyncrasy, showing us once again how hopeless the
idea of a universally applicable conversational systematics would be.’ But if we
dig a little further, we will see that this Rossel practice is not so divorced from the
practices familiar in English. To see this we need to revert to Sacks and Schegloff ’s
(1979) dense little note on person reference (see also Schegloff, 1995). They note
that there seem to be two preferences which govern the choice of referring
expressions for persons. The first is a preference for achieving recognition, that is,
using a name or a description (a recognitional) which allows recipients to realize
that they know the person referred to. The second is a preference for using a
minimal form to do the job, for example, a first name alone. Clearly, these can
often both be satisfied simultaneously, as when I refer to one of the editors of this
special issue as ‘Sandro’ and that’s precisely the name by which you know him.
But sometimes a minimal form may not be sufficient – and in that case, speakers
will often try a minimal form with a rising intonation (a ‘try marker’), and if
recognition is not forthcoming, will then incrementally augment the expression
with e.g. another name:
(3) Sacks and Schegloff (1979: 20)
1 A: Is shorty there,
2 B: oo jest- Who?
3 A: Eddy? ← try-marked first name
4 Woodward? ← upgrade with last name
[
5 B: Oo jesta minute
Sacks and Schegloff take this kind of sequence as evidence for a ranking between
the two preferences: Go for recognition if you possibly can, and successively relax
minimization until recognition is achieved.
444 Discourse Studies 7(4–5)
If we now look back at the Rossel sequence, here repeated in English gloss
minus the interruptions, we see that the sequence has a passing similarity to the
English Who?-engendered sequence:
(4)
1 N: That girl said to me she’ll go across on thursday
2 P: Who did?
3 N: °That girl° ← no upgrade
(0.4)
4 P: Mby:aa’s daughter [ did?
5 M: Kpaputa’s [ wife?
6 N: °EBF° ← minimal assent
(1.4)
7 N: HEAD-POINT ← non-verbal upgrade
8 P: Kpaputa’s wife?
9 N: EBF ← non-verbal assent
Both sequences are triggered by ‘Who?’, thus indicating that recognition is being
pursued, both in response to a minimal referring expression. Although in the
Rossel case no verbal upgrade later follows, a non-verbal upgrade does eventually
appear at line 7. Clearly, there’s a serious impediment in the Rossel case, for the
reasons we now understand – it is as if N has temporary culturally imposed
aphasia, and P and M must do the guessing typical under such circumstances
(see Goodwin, 2003). But nevertheless there’s evidence that the same two
preferences are in play, and with the same ranking, and a successive relaxation
of minimization is employed until recognition is achieved.
A nice payoff from seeing the commonality between the English and Rossel
sequence is that we appreciate that this procedure for reconciling two preferences
in conflict, namely the successive relaxation of minimization, gives us a local,
possibly cultural, metric for what counts as minimal. By this metric, Rossel
pointings and eyebrow flashes count as more minimal than their verbal
equivalents. N has never said the taboo word, nor has he even given further
verbal clues to it – recognition has been achieved by a gesture and non-verbal
assents to guesses. This, in fact, has cross-cultural application: it’s a common-
place of the ethnographic literature that the gestural takes over from the verbal
in situations of taboo – consider Trappist signs, or the Warlpiri sign-language
used by widows (Kendon, 1988). Incidentally, pointing in Rossel interaction has
a much more fundamental role than in Western societies, because Rossels have
an ‘absolute’ system of spatial orientation which allows them to point accurately
to distant places knowing that their interlocutors can interpret the point
precisely without supplementary language (see Levinson, 2003, on ‘absolute’
spatial systems). Consequently, even when a name is given, there is often an
accompanying point to the person’s home base – in these taboo situations the
name has gone, but the point remains.
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To see that the partial match between the English and Rossel examples is not
an accident, compare the other kind of sequence that Sacks and Schegloff
(1979) draw attention to. In the first type, just reviewed, the recipient has a
problem with a reference, and instigates the sequence with ‘Who?’ In the second
type of sequence, the speaker foresees that the recipient just may have a problem
with a reference, and so try-marks it on first usage. Once again, the first try is
minimal, and when that doesn’t succeed, the reference is upgraded, perhaps by a
second name, and if that doesn’t work, by a description. Consider:
(5) Sacks and Schegloff (1979: 19)
1 A: . . . well I was the only one other than the uhm tch Fords?, ← try-marked name
2 Uh Mrs Holmes Ford? ← try-marked upgrade
3 You know uh the the cellist? ← try-marked upgrade
[
4 B: Oh yes. She’s she’s the cellist
5 A: Yes well she and . . . . . . . .
So again, the sequence type indicates preference for recognition being more
important than minimization, while the successive, step-by-step relaxation of
minimization indicates that it is only reluctantly departed from.
Now compare this to the following Rossel sequence:
(6) R02 v4 s1 Demo_Person 2 3:29
1 J: mu kópu mwo a pyaa wo, mu dmââdî ← try-marked on underlined
‘The thing that happened a while ago?, to that girl?’ 
[points S over mountain to her natal village]
(.)
2 mu dmââdî ngê, cha w:ee ← try-marked on underlined
‘That girl?, you see?’
[points W to where she died] ← upgraded gesture
[
3 R: EBF éé
‘right’
4 J: yi dmââdî pi kuu, yed:oo nipi nmî dmââdî cha w:ee,
‘That girl is not separate from us, she’s our girl’
Now in this sequence, yet again, the speaker is tongue-tied. He wants to refer to
a girl who comes from his village, but she has just died (the reason he is raising
the topic is that he should really be at her mortuary feast right now). By the
name-tabooing rules, he should not name her. So in line 1, he mentions ‘that
thing’, the unfortunate death, pointing over the mountain to where the girl came
from, with a try marker (sharp rise–fall) on ‘that thing’ and ‘that girl’. He looks
at the recipient R throughout, holding the gesture, but R shows no sign of
recognition. When there is no uptake in the slight pause, J repeats the same
indeterminate phrase ‘that girl’, opening his eyes wide as another ‘try-marking’
signal, but now supplementing the description with another, different gesture, indi-
cating in fact where she died. (As mentioned, gestures to a person’s home-base,
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as in example (1), are quite standard, especially in these name-taboo cases, so the
gesture accompanying the second try in line 2 can be taken as giving a
substantial second clue to the girl’s identity. The first gesture is a point, the
second gesture with a flat palm suggests ‘lying down’, as in dead!) Recognition is
now achieved, signalled by an eyebrow flash in overlap with the tag in line 2, and
a ‘right’. As soon as it is achieved, J proceeds, just as in the English example. See
Figure 9 for a sequence of stills.
To summarize: Rossel people have an ‘exotic’ naming taboo for in-laws and
the recently dead. Yet when we look at how this taboo is handled in conversation,
we see that, nevertheless, sequences where person reference is in doubt look
closely analogous to English ones. Let’s see if we can formulate the similarities
and differences. One way we can think about it is that Rossel simply has an
additional preference folded in to the two English preferences. For English, all we
need is something like this:
(7) English preference rules for person reference (after Sacks and Schegloff, 1979)
Preference 1: Use a recognitional form if possible
Preference 2: Use a single or minimal form if possible
Resolution: When 1 and 2 are in conflict, apply 1 and relax 2 successively until
recognition is achieved
For Rossel we need to fold in the additional preference rule about not naming
taboo persons:
(8) Rossel preference rules for person reference
Preference 1: 
a. Use a recognitional form if possible
b. If not possible by Preference 3, go for recognition elsewise (e.g. by pointing)
Preference 2: Use a single or minimal form if possible
Preference 3: Don’t use a recognitional form when referring to a taboo relative
Resolution: 
(a) When 1 and 2 are in conflict, apply 1a and relax 2 successively until recognition is
achieved (as in English)
(b) When 1 and 3 are in conflict, apply 1b, and relax 2 successively until recognition is
achieved (e.g. by gesture or indirect reference)
The English rules are not then superseded, they are rather supplemented. And
this is just as well, since investigation of other languages seems to show
something like the English rules clearly at work too (see Levinson, 2004, for a
little evidence). In fact, I take it as a reasonable presumption that they form a
universal base in this domain. In that case, what this rendition makes clear is
that the Rossel case folds the universal and the culturally specific into a unified
procedure. And this gives us an interesting model for thinking about this
important domain of person reference, which is a domain where cultural factors,
if anywhere, ought to be much in evidence.
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6. Models for the interaction of language, culture and interaction
Let’s come back to the central issues by way of a summary. I have followed two
rather different lines of reasoning about culture, language and interaction on
Rossel Island. In the first, we followed the road of kinship theory. We looked at the
Rossel kinship system with its dominant theme of matriclans. We saw how this
impinges on the language, with its Crow-type kinterm system, and its in-law
taboo vocabulary. We also saw how it impinges on the interaction system,
importing rules of avoidance behaviour, and constructing a special kind of
joking: father-in-law jokes, with their distinctive mode of reception. Finally, we
saw how the name-taboo on in-laws and the recently dead kin affects the micro-
systematics of person reference in conversation. Now we bought many of these
insights courtesy of comparative kinship theory. Such a theory is a macro-level,
‘bird’s-eye’ theory which is by essence comparative across societies. Such a
theory is not available to the participants in interaction – it is not a theory for
interaction, although it is a theory much concerned with predicting properties of
interaction, like joking behaviour, in-law avoidance and name-taboos.
What this suggests, to me at least, is that it is essential to keep our levels
separated. Higher-order generalizations about sociocultural systems can have
explanatory power for understanding interaction systems, just as they help us
understand aspects of language like kinterms, taboo vocabulary or honorifics.
The model suggested is of three distinct levels of analysis, or three different kinds
of systems – sociocultural systems, interaction systems and language systems –
interlocked in various ways. One doesn’t have to be a realist about these entities
– one can treat them as analytical fictions, whereby one gets a better model of the
whole shebang by finding relatively differentiated subsystems which seem to
have organizing principles of their own.
But how then should one think about the interplay between these systems? I
still think the old Durkheimian trick of finding crucial intermediate variables has
much to recommend it: having analytically pulled things apart, we now need to
find a way to zip them up together again. Thinking about kinship, for example,
makes one realize that social relationships play such a role as crucial inter-
mediate variables. The kinship system gives one n types of social relationship.
Each of these types carries interactional expectations and constraints (such as
avoidance and joking in classical kinship theory), and each has linguistic reflexes
in terminology and linguistic etiquette.
The second road we followed started to take interactional systematics
seriously as a complex world of its own, concentrating on person reference. The
principle of going for maximal effect (recognition) while maintaining minimal
expression only works because there’s a machinery that allows the minimal
expression to be upgraded sequentially if necessary. This engenders the recog-
nizable sequences we could find in both English and Rossel. And the culturally
specific Rossel business of suppressing reference by name in certain cases can be
handled within this machinery, mutatis mutandis. This suggests one model for
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thinking about how (putative) universal properties of human interaction may
interact with culture-specific rules. That in turn would constitute steps towards
a real science of human interaction.
Now a science of interaction could contribute much to a science of social
systems. For example, as we have seen, it would allow us to cash out Lévi-
Strauss’s plusses and minuses, relationships of respect and familiarity, as proce-
dures for ‘being indirect’ or ‘being friendly’ or ‘being jokey’. Indeed, the whole
business of the texture of social relationships belongs to a science of interaction.
Taboo and avoidance relations are an interesting case in point: they may be
expressed in a special linguistic system (as in the Rossel in-law vocabulary), and
in other culturally specific mores (as in Warlpiri sign language), but the con-
ceptual underpinnings belong to the theory of participation structure (Goffman,
1979; Goodwin, 1981): persons who stand in such relations are ratified
overhearers, not possible participants. And the principles governing expression
of such relations are interactional principles: we’ve also seen how taboos, for
example, rely on a scale of minimality which itself can be precisely calibrated
using the procedures for person reference.
In the same way, a science of interaction can contribute to a science of
language in many different ways. Consider, for example, that we take the
universal existence of short personal names for granted. In principle, things
could be otherwise. Sacks and Schegloff ’s preferences suggest both plausible
linguistic universals and the rationale for them: all societies have kinterms and
proper names as established ways of meeting the two preferences for person
reference simultaneously. Second, the principles of person reference are arguably
just instantiations of much more general principles governing verbal interaction
– connected closely I have argued to Gricean principles of inference (see
Levinson, 1987). Those general principles, which really belong to the inter-
actional level, can be seen to have a deep impact on language structure (see
Levinson, 2000).
7. Conclusion
I have argued for the ‘safe’ interpretation of Schegloff ’s principle that social order
is the local product of interaction. The ‘safe’ interpretation holds that, yes,
interaction is properly seen as constituting a system in its own right, and, yes, we
should not think in terms of interaction as playing out structures determined at
another level. And we can understand the irritation of the interactional experts
watching amateurs from other disciplines making a mess of interaction analysis:
please stay off our turf, they are saying, until you understand the principles that
govern this level. The ‘safe’ interpretation, then, is entirely consistent with the
background assumptions I have worked with, as sketched in section 2, namely
the idea of analytically separate systems, hooked up again through the study of
crucial intermediate variables.
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So why does the ‘dangerous’ interpretation seem so attractive? Because there
is a seemingly irrefutable logic that runs as follows: if there was no interaction,
there would be no social system and no language. Moreover, for there to be this
particular system, and this particular language, the society and language have to
reproduce – children have to be inducted into it. And the only way this can
happen is through interaction. Furthermore, what this social system (or this
language) is turns out to be ultimately malleable – changes in the conduct of
social (and verbal) interaction will engender changes in the fabric of institutions
(and in the rules of language). That was the point of Schegloff ’s (1987) analysis
of presidential press conferences.
But I think one can concede all that without buying the ‘dangerous’ inter-
pretation, namely the idea that interaction determines every other level of
phenomena, including social systems and linguistic systems. To see this, it’s
necessary to appreciate an important distinction between interactional
reductionism and interactional constructivism. Interactional reductionism banishes
talk of social systems or grammatical systems, in favour of a reconstruction in
terms of interactional principles. But interactional reductionism has all the
problems that radical reductionism has in any field – it throws out other levels of
analysis at which principle and order can be better captured.5 Ultra-Darwinism
in biology, i.e. Dennett’s dangerous version of Darwin’s idea, which reduces
everything to genes, bypasses the organism and ignores the fact that natural
selection works on phenotypes at the organism level, not directly on genes. In a
similar way, interactional reductionism would throw out all the carefully
nourished babies of comparative sociology, anthropology and linguistics with the
bathwater.
Interactional constructivism, on the other hand, is not a pernicious doctrine
at all. It holds that interaction constructs social relations, which in turn
construct social institutions (the innocent reading of Schegloff ’s analysis of
presidential press conferences). It also holds that uses of language can construct
new rules of usage, which can construct new rules of grammar. Social systems
change, and languages change, under the motor of lots of little changes in
interaction. But the room for interactional manoeuvre is often very small –
Manny can’t change the rules of court like the president can change the rules of
press conferences, nor can he change the rules of English grammar (even though
he may have tried to). Even if one thinks of social systems and grammar as the
outcome of aeons of interactional events, at any one point they have a coercive,
constraining influence on what interactants can do and what they can mean.
Those constraints are best understood by treating them as systems in their own
right. In that case, we are back to the working model I am trying to purvey: three
independent systems hooked together by crucial intermediate variables.
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N O T E S
1. The general drift of Schegloff ’s (1987) paper is perhaps towards the ‘dangerous’
interpretation. But in footnote 26 the idea is entertained that interaction, as an
‘autonomous and structured field of action’, plays a mediating role between ‘macro’
and ‘micro’, or between anthropology and the cognitive sciences. This view is much
more in line with what I am calling the ‘safe’ interpretation.
2. I have been conducting fieldwork there since 1995, supported by the Max Planck
Society, recently under the European Science Foundation programme ‘Origin of Man,
Language and Languages’.
3. All the frame grabs in this article were prepared with the ELAN multimedia annotation
tool developed by the MPI for Psycholinguistics in Nijmegen, and downloadable for free
from http://www.mpi.nl/tools/.
4. The version of the theory given here is actually nearer to Radcliffe-Brown’s original
than Lévi-Strauss’s later elaboration – however, most of the differences concern
relations within the kinship atom other than those focused on here (Lévi-Strauss
found only one putative counterexample to the generalizations focused on here). My
thanks to Jack Sidnell for insisting on precision here.
5. Consider the idea that English grammar can be reduced to the state of neurons in
English speakers’ heads. It has the same apparently irrefutable logic as interactional
reductionism: without those neurons, there would be no English grammar. But
actually, no amount of neuroanatomy is going to extract the rules of English grammar
out of brain tissue (and anyway whose head should we dissect?).
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